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A stra t 
Gustav Stresemann, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and German Foreign Minister of the 
1920s, is well-known for the international cooperation of the Weimar Republic with 
Europe’s great powers. He simultaneously pursued a peaceful modification of the eastern 
boundaries of Germany, while accepting the reality of the Versailles system. This paper 
analyses the change in Germany s relations with her eastern neighbours, as well as 
Stresemann’s intentions to achieve border revisions and to support German minorities 
abroad. It is especially exciting to consider the purposes of the German approach to the 
Soviet Union in Stresemann’s program, and if this could have been used to force 
concessions from the West. The study also sheds light on why Stresemann overestimated 
the revisionist potential of the  ocarno Treaties, and on the remaining possibilities of 
border revisions that existed at the end of his six-year tenure as Foreign Minister. 
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Intro u tion 
Gustav Stresemann recently became the focus of attention of the German press when the 
political party Alternative f r Deutschland (AfD) named its party foundation after him, 
resulting in a legal dispute with the grandsons of the late foreign minister (cf. Spiegel 
201 ). According to the heirs, the views of their grandfather were far from everything the 
AfD represents. This brought forward the whole  uestion of what the legacy of 
Stresemann means for Germany, for Europe and for history. 
 
1 Péter Hevő PhD is a  ecturer in Modern and Contemporary World History at E tv s  oránd University 
in Budapest. In addition, he works as a Museologist at the Hungarian Museum of Science, Technology and 
Transport.  
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During the days of the Second World War, and especially after the founding of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Stresemann became a popular “what would 
have happened if” personality of the Weimar era – a defender of the Republic, who, had 
he not died too early, could have averted the rise of National Socialism and Adolf Hitler 
(Zimmermann, 19  ),2 and who was also a prominent supporter of Franco-German 
rapprochement (Kr ger, 19  ) and a true European (Weidenfeld, 19  :   0–  0). In 
other words, almost an “early Konrad Adenauer,” who struggled with similar foreign 
policy challenges, albeit under different cicumstances. (Interestingly, Stresemann was 
two years younger than Adenauer, and had a lot of disagreements with the  ord Mayor 
of Cologne.) As an answer to this West German nostalgia, several were published in the 
19 0s and 19 0s whose argument was precisely the opposite: Stresemann was neither a 
democrat, nor a politican of peace, and even less the precursor of integration – rather, he 
was a cunning and pragmatic politician who fought for territorial revisions with no 
military means and diplomatic elbow-room available (Thimme, 19  : 2    Turner, 19    
Koszyk, 19 9). Partly due to this debate, a more balanced picture of Stresemann’s aims 
and role, and of the German foreign policy environment of the 1920s at large, ultimately 
formed in the ensuing years. 
 
  e earl   ears 
There largely is consensus, historically, about Stresemann’s viewpoint on the First World 
War. A politician of the national liberals already well-known before 191 , Stresemann 
was an ardent proponent of political and economic expansion, who even laid serious 
territorial claims after the July Crisis of 191  (Baechler, 2002:   ). Among these, the one 
concerning the issue of Eastern borders of Germany was not even moderate, in fact: it 
called for ceding most Polish territories under Russian control at the time (including 
Warsaw) and the Baltics as far as the Narva Bay to Germany. German economic 
expansionism was to be strengthened by a Central European customs union ( otizen   r 
einen  ortrag Stre emann  in   emnitz am       g  t     ,  td. in Maxelon, 19 2:   .). 
Although he was personally surprised by the prolongation of war, he never ceased to 
support it until September 191  – from which point on he trusted the goodwill of the 
Entente, and, most of all, the goodwill of President Wilson (Arnold 2000: 2 ). The desired 
mild peace was not forthcoming, however, and the  ei   lost  0 000 km2 of territory. 
 
2 According to son Wolfgang, his father became a convinced democrat in the first half of the 1920s 
(Stresemann, 19 9). 
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Germany had to cede the Memel to  ithuania, Posen, West Prussia and some parts of 
Upper Silesia to Poland, the Hultschin territory to Czechoslovakia, while Danzig came 
under the protectorate of the  eague of Nations as a  free city.’ Exacerbated, Stresemann 
prompted the refusal of the signing of the pact only to face some years later as chancellor 
of the Weimar Republic the length to which the French were willing to go in defense of 
the system, and what the possible conse uences were for Germany. 
By 192 , the Republic was on the edge of the abyss. In the first days of the new 
year, French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr. The official motive was Germany’s 
failure to meet French demands for coal delivery, but it was rather a warning and a 
punitive reaction to the signing of the Rapallo Treaty of 1922: the most powerful 
continental power, France, could not tolerate the rapprochement of Germany and Soviet-
Russia, the two most powerful discontents of the Versailles system. The occupation 
brought about serious conse uences: the announced passive resistance caused 
hyperinflation and separatist movements were mushrooming throughout the country. 
Stresemann thus inherited a country in serious economic and political upheaval – and he, 
by and large, managed to steer through the storm. While the resistance of the Social 
Democrats caused his downfall as chancellor in November 192 , he continued as Minister 
of Foreign Affairs – a position he held up until his death in 1929. It was an era during the 
course of which the German foreign ministry was in the hands of an experienced person 
who brought the formative experience of the year 192  to the  ob. 
The realization of the possible conse uences of Berlin’s disregarding its own 
defeated status and the realities of the new European power relations was traumatic for 
many in the German establishment. Germany’s hardships in 192  have shown that the 
emancipation of the defeated country could not come at the expense of French security. 
Stresemann therefore started to look for peaceful means of conflict resolution – in a 
framework that for him involved not the giving up of any portion of national sovereignty 
in a supranational framework but an enhanced form international cooperation, rather. This 
conception of his falls far from the nature of the post-WWII European integration efforts. 
Upon learning of Stresemann’s earlier positions and the so-called “ etter to the Crown 
Prince” of 192 ,  many subse uently  uestioned the sincerity of Stresemann’s politics. It 
 
  The letter was published in the early 19 0s and led to a revision of the previously one-sidedly positive 
image of Stresemann in Western European countries. The document was drafted in September 192 , shortly 
after the  ocarno talks and it contains references to revisionist plans of the foreign minister. Some of its 
phrases may be interpreted as suggesting that Stresemann, with an eye to Germany’s weakness, was playing 
to allaying the victorious powers and was only waiting for the right moment to set aside the Treaty of 
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is very likely that he has never been a pacifist, but he certainly did adapt to the existing 
realities: Germany was not in a military, economic, and, above all, geopolitical position 
to advance its goals with means of power to change the most hurting points of the 
Versailles Treaty. In terms of goals, he had many, however – the nature of these and the 
priorities therein are worth examining. 
Although Stresemann labeled the revision of Germany’s Eastern borders as the 
priority of his foreign policy (April 19, 192   td. in Gratwohl 19 2: 2 0), he considered 
the country’s emancipation and the recovery of its sovereignty as the real first step.  Of 
all the lost Eastern territories, the Polish Corridor was the most irritating to him – the area 
which permanently cut Eastern Prussia from the rest of the  ei  . Stresemann called this 
the “greatest mistake” of the Versailles Treaty, a dead-end (Stresemann, 19 9:  92) which 
poisons the European peace in the long run.  The Sudetenland, involving the problem of 
the more than three million ethnic Germans stuck in Czechoslovakia, was another serious 
issue, but it did not evoke emotions of such intensity as did the Polish Corridor.  astly, 
one should always keep in mind the issue of the  n   l  , the union of Germany and 
Austria, which was a lingering issue since the end of WWI, and would have resulted in a 
German–Italian border greatly desired by Stresemann himself (Wright, 200 : 2 0). The 
goals were thus more or less fixed for Stresemann, the only  uestion was how to reach 
them. 
 
A  ro isin  a  roa   
As stated above, the critical experience of 192  established the idea that Germany has to 
normalize relations with the Western powers before focusing on territorial revision in the 
East. In this, Stresemann was eventually aided by political changes in West Europe. The 
British grew anxious of French hegemonistic attempts and the slow shift of the European 
balance of power, so  ondon – together with Washington – put pressure on Paris to 
 
Versailles. Stresemann was especially criticised in France, for his alleged insincerity, as having misled 
British and French politicians in  ocarno (Kolb, 200 : 10 ). 
  Primary ob ectives, such as the solution of Germany’s reparation payments, withdrawal of the Inter-Allied 
Military Control Commission, end of the Allied Rhineland occupation, an early return to the Saar and 
Germany’s entry into the  eague of Nations (which would also serve the support of German minorities 
abroad). 
     zei  n ng Stre emann        e r ar     , in: ADAP, Serie A, Bd. 9, Dokument 1  . Cited by Wright, 
200 : 2 1. According to a document sent to German Ambassador to Warsaw Ulrich Rauscher, the 
Wilhelmstrasse considered possible the recovery of Danzig, the corridor, and the northern part of Upper 
Silesia. On the other hand, Poland would have been allowed to retain the Posen region as well as special 
transit rights and free ports in Danzig.   nderla    om       ni     , in: ADAP, Serie A, Bd. 1 , Dokument 
1  . Cited by Wright, 200 :  1 – 1 . 
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implement revisions in the German reparations issue.  Meanwhile, the French, in the 
wake of the occupation of the Ruhr, have realized that the collapse of Germany would 
bring about serious conse uences for themselves as well. All of the above resulted in the 
pro-rapprochement forces gaining strength in Paris in opposition to Prime Minister 
Raymond Poincaré. 
The most spectacular event of the Franco-German rapprochement was the 
conclusion of the  ocarno Treaties. The treaties signed in October 192  constituted a 
mutual sanctification of the Frenco–German and Belgian–German borders guaranteed by 
Italy and Britain. Though Stresemann came under attack in Germany for having 
renounced the possibility to recover lost territories in the West, the foreign minister aptly 
pointed out the other side of the coin in one of his speeches: the prohibition of offensive 
war “involves French statesmen at least as much as it does us, since they are facing a 
feeble country with all their land armies, and there are  ust enough people in their own 
countries who demand the borders to push to the Rhine” (Stresemann, 200 : 21 ). In 
other words, while solidifying Germany’s Western borders may have come at a cost, it 
nevertheless significantly decreased the vulnerability of the country. The real German 
bravado of the negotiation was the achievement that the great power guarantee did not 
come to cover Germany’s Eastern borders – Poland and Czechoslovakia only signed 
bilateral treaties with Germany on the one hand, and France on the other. The Eastern 
borders were thus not sanctified and left a door open to revision. And even though 
Czechoslovakian Prime Minister Eduard Bene  officially welcomed the treaties and 
called them “an intelligent effort” of Germany “to recover its lost power” ( td in. 
Gratwohl, 19  :   ), it was still not only a failure for him, but also a pronouncedly 
humilitating one.  
Germany’s accession to the  eague of Nations is usually considered as the other 
peak of Stresemann’s achivements. This move was, however, often criticized at home 
(e.g. President of the German  ei   Paul von Hindenburg had his ob ections, too) and it 
even ran the risk of souring the otherwise blooming German–Soviet relations. Germany 
and Soviet-Russia, effectively excluded from the negotiations at Versailles, were 
 
  The fact that Austen Chamberlain became foreign minister in 192 , who had met with Bismarck during 
his youth, and considered rapprochement with Germany a priority, certainly played a part in it 
(Chamberlain, 19  :  2). 
  According to Paul Schmidt, the interpreter taking part at the negotiations, the Czechoslovakian foreign 
minister and his Polish colleague Alexander Skrzy ski were compelled to sit in their hotel rooms while the 
’big guys’ were talking, and it was only in the final phase that they were allowed to take part in the talks. 
Cf. Elz, 200 : 11 . 
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gravitating towards one another in the early 1920s. Booming economic relations, the 
signing of the Rapallo Treaty, and the cooperation between the Red Army and the 
Reichswehr were indicative of this rapprochement. The Germans thought it a good device 
to strengthen their position vis- -vis the winners of the World War amidst their 
international isolation, while in Moscow they wanted to use this connection to thwart the 
emergence of a dreaded unified anti-Soviet front in the West. However, in the eyes of the 
Soviets, Germany was treading tratcherous waters by  oining the  eague of Nations.  
Stresemann mollified Soviet ob ections with the argument that Germany as a permanent 
member of the Council of the  eague of Nations could effectively veto the 
implementation of sanctions against the Soviet Union (Stresemann, 19  :    ). 
Western powers were watching the Soviet–German rapprochement with 
increasing anxiety since Rapallo, given that a fourth partition of Poland, stuck between 
the two ma or states, was in the interest of both of them (Niedhart, 200 : 22). The so-
called Treaty of Berlin, signed on April 2 , 192 , created yet another source of anxiety: 
it not only promised mutual neutrality in the event of an outside attack, but excluded any 
participation in an economic or financial boycott against the other country. Further, there 
were many supporters in both countries of the broadening of military cooperation,9 an 
eventuality that generated almost hysterical reactions in the French press. It is the reason 
why Stresemann rushed to clarify that this move would be “irreconcilable with the whole 
line of our policy” (Arnold, 2000: 10 ). Indeed, the aggravated fear of a possible Soviet–
German military alliance was, even as it was understandable, ultimately unfounded.  
Stresemann expressed a certain principled reticence regarding Bolshevism but, 
more importantly, he did not want to risk the blooming relationship between his country 
and France and Britain with the Soviet connection. As chancellor, he made stepts to cut 
back cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army, and cautiously let the 
Soviets know that Berlin would not support common attempts at revision at the expense 
 
  The Soviets were afraid that Germany, under Article 1  of the Covenant, would be compelled to let 
through French troops on its territory towards the Soviet Union  or be compelled to take part in economic 
sanctions against the Soviet Union. 
  A note by Stresemann in his diaries on the 2 th April 192 :  T e So iet Go ernment  ad a ked t at at 
lea t a  art o  t e   eini   e Metall erke in     eldor   a  art o  t e  e t   e  erke  t e 
  einmetall erke  a  art o  t e Siemen  S    kert  erke  and t e Kr     erke in    en    o ld  e 
tran  erred to t e  onetz   i     a in in     ia     ad a ked  or time to t ink t i  o er  and t ro g  t e 
agen y o   ord     ernon and St amer    ad got into to     it  t e  ngli   Go ernment   ondon   
an  er  ad  een  n a o ra le   n t e meantime  t e German  ational  and military  ir le   ad  arned 
me to a  e t t e So iet o  er  a  t i   o ld lead to a  ort o  military allian e  et een t e t o Po er   and 
t e  onetz  a in  o ld  e ome a     o German ar enal   In: Stresemann, 19   (vol. 2.):  90. 
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of Poland. He did not want to burn that bridge, either, nonetheless, so both parties signed 
the Treaty of Berlin in order to satisfy the Soviets to a certain extent. Thus Stresemann 
killed two birds with one stone: he turned down the voice of the right opposition at the 
Reichstag, while he kept the Soviets close enough to keep them from re- oining’ the 
Entente.10 It is important to note that Western orientation was more important for 
Stresemann than German–Soviet relations were. The latter figured in his thinking merely 
as a lever in negotiations with the Western powers. 
Due to the German foreign policy successes in 192  and 192 , the career of 
Gustav Stresemann was at its peak and for a moment it seemed that his strategy would 
work and he would eventually secure revision of the Eastern borders with the consent of 
the Western powers. He was more and more convinced that Germany would not need 
war, since it could use its economic leverage in Central and Eastern Europe to further 
German interests in a peaceful way (Baechler 2002:   ). 
German economic pressure was offensive in character mostly in Poland. From 
June 192  they imposed heavy tariffs on Polish goods which bore serious conse uences 
for their Eastern neighbor. Stresemann’s admitted goal was to bring Poland to its heels. 
He wrote that the peaceful resolution of the border issue, one that fits to Germany’s 
demands “cannot be reached until Poland’s economic and financial distress has reached 
an extreme stage and reduced the entire Polish body politic to a state of powerlessness” 
(Arnold, 2000:   ). The tariff war was waged with determination by the foreign minister, 
while Poland’s international position was weakening due to the conse uences of the 
 ocarno treaties and its failure to reach the ardently desired permanent seat at the Council 
of the  eague of Nations. 
Due to German ascendancy, the revision of the Treaty of Versailles was no longer 
a taboo among some Western politicians and public opinion. French  Foreign Minister 
Aristide Briand talked about a possible peaceful modification of the Polish–German 
border in August 192  with the German ambassador to Paris, assuring the legate that 
“France certainly will not stand in the way” (Gratwohl, 19  :   ). British Prime Minister 
Stanley Baldwin and Foreign Minister Austen Chamberlain likewise recognized 
Germany’s right to revision. According to Chamberlain, German success needed patience 
and a continuation of its existing foreign policy. Moreover, he stated in the House of 
 
   Stresemann’s statement to the press on April 2 th, 192 :      Germany      a  t e  ridge t at   o ld 
 ring toget er  a t and  e t in t e de elo ment o    ro e   In: Stresemann, 19   (vol. 2.):    . 
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Commons that Poland would make a great service to European peace if it would start 
negotiations about the border issue (Gratwohl, 19  :   ). 
 
All  uiet on t e  astern front 
Notwithstanding the promising beginning, the limits of peaceful revisionism were 
becoming evermore apparent from 192  on, and Stresemann’s elbow-room was 
shrinking. At the peak of the Polish crisis, in May 192 , J zef Pi sudski took power in 
Warsaw and restored his country’s stability. The marshal wanted to build better relations 
with Germany (Stresemann 19  :  00), and with the reforms he implemented, managed 
to stop the economic free fall of his country. In October 192 , Poland obtained loans from 
the U.S. and Great Britain, which made it clear that Poland could not be destroyed by 
German economic pressure (Arnold, 2000: 110). This signaled the failure of one of 
Stresemann’s long-term goals, and accordingly, the diplomatic offensive against the 
Polish state was redirected to the field of minorities. As part of this newer strategy, they 
supported the organizations of Eastern European Germans as a means to stop assimilation 
and migration. In the  eague of Nations and the world press they made efforts to keep 
the issue on the agenda. In December 192 , Stresemann even got involved in a very sharp 
debate with Polish Foreign Minister August Zaleski during a sessions of the Council of 
the  eague. 
Peaceful revision was not promising to deliver Stresemann’s goals by this point, 
and neither was the Anschlu  a prospect. During a meeting in March 192 , Stresemann 
and his Austrian colleague Rudolf Ramek agreed that the unification of the two countries 
is not timely, so the propaganda efforts directed towards this goal had to be scaled down 
(Wright, 200 ,    ). Stresemann likewise suggested patience regarding the German–
Czechoslovakian border correction which could not be addressed “in the foreseeable 
future.” In a letter of June 192 , he foresaw that in 20 to 2  years Czechoslovakia would 
be ruled by the Czechs only and that the German minority there would be forced into the 
background. Assimilation, as he saw it, could not be thwarted by war. Instead, the 
Germans should organize themselves politically and culturally and be part of the 
government to reach a position where they would be able to effectively hinder the process 
of assimilation.11 This was indeed what the German minority in Czechoslovakia did, and, 
 
    T e  it ation i  not to  e altered  y  ar   n t e e  ir  m tan e  in t enty to t enty  i e year   ze  o 
Slo akia  ill  e a State  om letely  ontrolled  y  ze     in   i   t e German element merely  lay  t e 
 art o   er ing maid   n t at a  o nt     t  or ard t e   e tion  or  on ideration   et er t e  ormation 
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from 192  on, the ethnic German parties took part in Czechoslovak coalition 
governments. The German foreign minister thus suggested from Berlin to renounce 
confrontational politics. His pessimistic prognosis regarding any alternative to this 
approach eventually proved correct: twenty years later the German minority did in fact 
stop playing any role in the life of Czechoslovakia – only, this was largely due to the war. 
Stresemann’s enthusiasm was cooled down by the shrinking volume of the 
previously supporting feedback from Western politicians. The two foreign ministers who 
went to some lengths to treat Germany as an e ual partner, Aristide Briand and Austen 
Chamberlain, did not promote border revisions beyond mere words. Unwilling to take 
stands, they suggested to handle the border issues directly with the countries affected, i.e. 
that Stresemann should negotiate with Marshal  i      i. In the event of such a meeting, 
the German minister did not deem it opportune to bring up the  uestion (Wright, 200 : 
 10). Furthermore, Briand and Chamberlain did not have domestic support for rethinking 
the Versailles system.12 In spite of all this, Stresemann held on to the Western orientation. 
Since he thought that the Red Army was even weaker than the Polish Army, he was 
skeptical about the practicality of  oining forces with the Soviets to reach treaty revisions. 
By 192  1929, this resulted in a stalemate: Eastern revisions would have had to be 
achieved without war and with Western great power consent, but Germany was running 
out of peaceful means. This was also the time when the foreign minister’s health began 
to decline. It is not by accident that his tone was so pessimistic in an interview of April 
1929 with a British  ournalist:  It is five years since we signed  ocarno. If you had given 
me one concession, I could have carried my people. I could still do it today, but you have 
given me nothing, and the trifling concessions which you have made have always come 
too late.”1  
His domestic support was also waning, as people were expecting spectacular 
successes and closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. A reorientation of foreign policy 
was evetually implemented not due to pressure from the political opposition, but due to 
the death of the foreign minister on October  , 1929. Presidential cabinets launched 
policies with a new tone, took on a more confrontative posture, and sought partnership 
 
o  a Go ernment in   i   t e German   ere re re ented  o ld  e  o  i le  on  ondition  o   o r e  t at 
 a eg ard   ere  ro ided  or t e  om lete   lt ral a tonomy o  t e German  ” Stre emann   letter to  err 
S   ager    ne  t       . In: Stresemann, 19   (vol. 2.):  1 . 
   Prime Minister Poincaré warned Briand in a letter:  T e  ei   trie  to take ad antage o  t e tem orary 
 inan ial di  i  ltie  o  t e  llie  in order to demoli   one  y one all t e  ondition  o  t e  ea e treaty   e 
  o ld not tolerate it  and   am determined to o  o e it mo t  ategori ally   Cited by Enssle, 19  : 9  . 
1  Cited by Enssle, 19  : 9  . 
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with countries that were similarly unhappy with their position post-Versailles: Italy and 
Hungary.1  
 
Con lusion 
Among historians, the net assessment of Gustav Stresemann’s  ocarno policy is no more 
consensual than it was among his contemporaries. Many believe that  ocarno raised 
overly high expectations regarding possible treaty revisions and was thus, ultimately, 
harmful to the Weimar Republic. Others point to the extraordinary successes he reached 
over the course of his tenure, from 192  to 1929. Either way, the foundations of his policy 
were sound: he was aware that the great powers would not eventually sit idly by German 
revisionism, and that the Entente was in a position to defeat Germany in war. Since it was 
unthinkable in German politics to give up revisionist claims, and the patience of the 
German constituency was not unlimited, Stresemann chose peaceful means and slow 
compromises to achieve this end. The later abrupt revisions, in the 19 0s, were only 
temporarily tolerated by the Western powers. This temporary toleration was, in fact, 
largely due to the trust accumulated during the Stresemann era. With the ultimate defeat 
of Nazi Germany in WWII, and after the expulsion of 1  million Central and Eastern 
European Germans in the late 19 0s, it became apparent that Stresemann was undeniably 
right that Germany would have been immeasurably better off re-drawing Eastern 
Europe’s borders with Western consent.  
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